As an emerging application of smart healthcare, mobile healthcare crowd sensing (MHCS) has become a research hotspot. However, how to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data and protect the privacy of user is still a challenge for MHCS. To handle these issues, an effective and secure privacy protection scheme is indispensable. Recently, a large-scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing was proposed by Liu et al. Unfortunately, we demonstrate that their scheme is insecure. This paper presents an improved anonymous scheme based on certificateless aggregate signature (CL-AS) for MHCS. First, considering the efficiency and the characteristics of the MHCS, the technique of aggregate signature is adopted, which can achieve batch verification and greatly save the bandwidth and computation resources. Second, anonymous communication is carried out in this scheme to realize privacy preservation. Third, based on certificateless cryptography, the proposed scheme can simplify the complicated certificate management and eliminate the key escrow problem. In addition, our scheme is provably secure against the existential forgery on adaptively chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model assuming the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. Furthermore, security and efficiency analysis shows that our scheme is secure and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, with the development of Internet of Things (IoT), wireless communication and cloud computing [1] - [4] , the e-healthcare application and wise medical system have gained great popularity in daily life and wide attentions from academic and industry. The World Health Organization (WHO) predicts that the average life expectancy of humans will reach 75 by 2030, the population of over the age of 60 will reach 60 million in America by 2050, while the figure for China will be 430 million [5] . Such a large number of elderly people will bring great challenges to the advancement The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Honghao Gao . of smart medical system. In order to deal with the challenges and provide better service for the aging population, currently, the mobile healthcare crowd sensing (MHCS) [6] , [7] is playing a key role for it can collect real-time physiological data through intelligent mobile sensing terminals and achieve data monitoring and analysis for remote medical diagnosis and decisions. And the most distinctive advantage of MHCS is its ability to simultaneously support the real-time perception, transmission and processing of a large-scale user data.
The design framework of the MHCS is shown in Fig.1 . The system generally consists of users, a cloud server and healthcare organizations. Users carry a variety of smart mobile sensing devices to collect their various physiological data. The cloud server is primarily responsible for storing and processing perceived data from users. Authorized healthcare organizations can access the cloud server to obtain user data and make appropriate diagnostic decisions and healthcare recommendations through professional analysis.
However, the MHCS also incurs challenges while facilitating daily lives, such as how to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data and protect the privacy of a large number of users. Due to the openness of the public wireless channel, the data transmission in the system is vulnerable to security threats such as tampering, interruption and eavesdropping. Unlike ordinary data, medical data has its particular sensitivity and importance. Any modification in the process of transmission may lead to significant risks. For example, interception, tampering and propagation of transmitted data from malicious attackers would probably cause serious problems even endanger user's life. Therefore, security is a crucial requirement for messages transmission in MHCS.
Privacy is another key issue in MHCS. From the user's point of view, they don't want to disclose their physiological information to some unauthorized organizations. It is worth noting that the safe collection and transmission of health information is the basis for the correct diagnosis of the MHCS. To address these issues, anonymous communication is necessary.
To satisfy the privacy and security requirements of MHCS, digital signature protocols are potential solutions. Several digital signature schemes [8] - [11] have been proposed for smart medical scenarios. However, these schemes are designed based on individual verification, which is costly in terms of time and resources. In the mobile healthcare crowd sensing scenario, tens of thousands of messages are waiting to be verified and processed by the cloud server, which have been sent from millions of users. Here, batch verification can be adopted to simultaneously process plenty of signatures on different messages from multiple users. Therefore, to improve the efficiency of the verification on numerous signatures and reduce the overhead of storage and bandwidth, an efficient batch verification scheme for MHCS is indispensable.
Actually, a series of corresponding batch verification schemes [12] - [18] have been gradually proposed. Recently, Liu et al. [19] proposed a large scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing. However, we demonstrate that the scheme fails to achieve the claimed safety attributes. Keeping in view of the aforementioned issues, the following contributions are presented in the paper. • We conduct cryptographic analysis of Liu et al.'s scheme. We point out the insecurity of the scheme by giving two specific attack schemes.
• We propose an improved scheme based on certificateless aggregate signature (CL-AS) for MHCS environment, which can achieve batch verification and privacy preservation. Moreover, our proposed scheme benefits from CL-AS property and anonymous communication property, it can satisfy most security requirements and resist various attacks.
• Finally, based on Random Oracle Model, our proposed scheme is provably secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message attack under the hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related works. The preliminary knowledge is illustrated in Section 3. Brief review and cryptanalysis of Liu et al.'s scheme is described in Section 4. In section 5, we give a detailed description of the proposed scheme. The security proof and performance evaluation are given in Section 6. We make a conclusion and discuss future work in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORKS
Designing an efficient and secure batch verification scheme for MHCS is one of several ongoing research challenges. Since Al-Riyami and Paterson [20] proposed a certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC), which can solve the complex certificate management problem in PKC schemes [21] and the key escrow issue in IBC schemes [22] , many researchers have presented various security solutions based on CL-PKC in recent years. Liu et al. [9] proposed two remote anonymous authentication protocols for wireless body area networks (WBAN) based on certificateless signature (CLS). The protocols satisfy many important security requirements and achieve lower computation cost. However, Xiong and Qin [10] pointed out that the protocols [9] cannot withstand the public key replacement attack and their authentication schemes doesn't achieve forward security and scalability. And then Xiong and Qin [10] proposed a scalable certificateless authentication protocol with anonymity for WBAN to address these issues. He et al. [23] also found the protocols [9] cannot resist the impersonation attack and give an improved scheme. To reduce the user's storage and computation overhead, Shen et al. [24] proposed a lightweight multi-layer authentication protocol for WBAN based on CLS. Then, Liu et al. [25] pointed out some flaws in the protocol [24] and proposed an improved scheme. However, these schemes are inefficient in MHCS scenarios due to individual verification based construction.
To aggregate n signatures of n different messages from n users into a single short signature, Boneh et al. [26] first introduced the concept of aggregate signature (AS) in Eurocrypt 2003. Verifier is able to identify all signers during verification in aggregate signature. Aggregation reduces the total bandwidth required and makes verification process more efficient. Subsequently, several aggregate signature schemes [27] - [29] have been widely used. With the in-depth study of aggregate signature, it is natural to combine aggregate signature with certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) to form certificateless aggregate signature (CL-AS) scheme. So far, many scholars have designed secure and efficient CL-AS schemes [14] , [30] - [36] according to different application objectives. However, most of these schemes have computational complexity for pairing computations that grows linearly with the number of signers.
To address the issue mentioned above, Xiong et al. [14] presented a certificateless aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing computations based on CLS. This scheme is efficient because the computation overhead is independent of the number of aggregated signatures. Besides, their schemes do not require a certain synchronization for aggregating randomness, which are more suitable for ad hoc networks. Unfortunately, Cheng et al. [31] , He et al. [37] and Zhang et al. [30] proved that the scheme [14] is insecure and gave some instances to show it cannot resist the forge attacks, i.e., an adversary can forge valid signature for any message. Li et al. [38] found that these above schemes cannot resist the malicious KGC attack, and they proposed a new scheme. Zhang et al. [30] demonstrated other two kinds of attacks which indicate that this scheme [14] cannot withstand attacks from the coalition of insider signers or a signer with a malicious KGC. In addition, various formal verification solutions [39] , [40] were used in these schemes. These proposals are efficient but insecure.
Most recently, Liu et al. [19] proposed a large-scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing based on CL-AS. Unfortunately, Zhang et al. [41] pointed out that scheme [19] fails to achieve the claimed security properties for they cannot resist signature forgery attacks. But Zhang et al. [41] did not propose an improved algorithm for these defects. From the related works, we can find that there are no comprehensive signature schemes designed for MHCS according to its characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to design an effective and secure anonymous batch verification scheme for MHCS.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section, we will describe some mathematical knowledge, system model, security model and security requirements. The explanations of the main notations are presented in Table 1 .
A. BILINEAR MAPS AND COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTION
Let G 1 denote an additive cyclic group with the prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order. Let P be a generator in G 1 , and e be a bilinear map such that e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
• Bilinear: For all P, Q ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z * q , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
• Non-degenerate: e(P, Q) ab = 1. • Computable: It is efficient to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem):
Given P, aP, bP ∈ G 1 , calculate abP for unknown a, b ∈ Z q and P is a generator of G 1 . The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm in solving the problem is defined to be
The CDH assumption shows that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Succ CDH is negligible.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
There are four entities in our proposed scheme, i.e., Clients, a data center (DC), medical organizations (MO) and a key generation center (KGC). The relationship and interaction among them are shown in Fig.2 .
Clients: Clients send the corresponding data which collected by smart mobile sensing devices to the DC according to the received task instructions.
Data Center: DC plays an important role in the system, for it not only publishes instructions from MO to clients, but also aggregates and verifies data from all clients. Medical Organizations: MO releases relevant instructions according to special purposes. Besides, they analyse the results of DC and make specific diagnosis.
KGC: KGC takes charge of system initialization, generates system public parameters and its private key. Besides, KGC is responsible for registering and assigning partial private key for clients. However, for some commercial interest, it may collect privacy data of clients. Therefore, KGC is a semi-trusted entity in the system.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The security requirements of the MHCS are listed as follows.
1) Batch Verification: To improve the computational performance and reduce the total bandwidth when receiving multiple messages for verifying, the verifier should execute batch verification simultaneously.
2) Anonymity: To protect the client's privacy, it is necessary that no one else can obtain the client's real identity from the intercepted messages.
3) Mutual Authentication: Clients and other entities in MHCS should be able to mutually authenticate, which is very important to protect user privacy and avoid potential attacks. 4) Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation indicates that only the legal clients can send messages, and they cannot deny the information that they sent before.
5) No Verifier Table:
To reduce the overhead of running the system and withstand the stolen verifier attack, the scheme should not provide verifier table.
6) Attack Resistance: Due to the open environment, the MHCS is susceptible to various attacks such as the impersonation attack, the replay attack, the modification attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. To ensure security, it is required that the signature scheme should be able to withstand those aforementioned attacks.
D. SECURITY MODEL
In the proposed scheme, we mainly consider adversary A ∈ (A 1 , A 2 ) as described in [20] , whose goal is to successfully forge the user's signature on the message. Adversary A has the following properties: 1) A can access any hash oracle and corresponding queries in the security model.
2) A 1 simulates an outside attacker, who cannot obtain the master key but can replace any user's public key.
3) A 2 simulates an honest-but-curious KGC, who is an inside attacker and has no power to replace any user's public key but can access the master key.
Based on the definitions of adversary's ability and the system model of MHCS, the security model is defined as a game played between a challenger C and an adversary A under the Random Oracle Model for the proposed scheme, here A can be A 1 or A 2 . Therefore, the security of proposed scheme will be converted to the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in the group where the signature is constructed.
Game I: This game is played between a challenger C 1 and a Type I adversary A 1 . The Type I attacker portrays an ''outside'' adversary, who can compromise user's secret value or replace user public key, but neither compromise master secret key nor get access to partial private key.
Game II: This game is played between a challenger C 2 and a Type II adversary A 2 . The Type II attacker acts as an ''honest-but-curious'' KGC who is given the master secret key in the initialization stage.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF LIU et al.'S SCHEME
Liu et al. [19] claimed that their CL-AS scheme and MHCS scheme are existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks in the Random Oracle Model. Unfortunately, we find these schemes cannot achieve the claimed security properties. In this section, we will briefly review their schemes and give two concrete attacks.
A. REVIEW OF LIU ET AL.'S CL-AS scheme Setup: Given a security parameter l, KGC executes the following algorithm to generate the system parameters.
• Generate two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with additive operation and multiplicative operation respectively, which have the same prime order q.
• Generate an admissible pairing e :
• Generate a random number s and compute P pub = sP, where s is the master private key and P pub is the public key.
• Choose two secure cryptographic hash functions H 1 :
H 2 , P pub } and store the master key s secretly.
Client-Key-Generation: Client C i with the identity ID i selects a random number r i = S i1 ∈ Z * q as its secret key and calculates its public key as PK i1 = r i P.
Partial-Key-Generation: KGC executes the following algorithm to get the partial key with the identity ID i .
• C i can obtain its private key (S i1 , S i2 ) and public key (PK i1 , PK i2 ). VOLUME 7, 2019 Signing: C i with the identity ID i sign on message m i as follows.
as a signature on the message m i . Verification: On receiving (U i , V i ), verifier can verify the signature as follows.
or not. If the equation is valid, it accepts the message; otherwise, discards it. Aggregation: Aggregator runs the following algorithm to obtain the final signature for all (U i , V i ) of the message m i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
Aggregate Verification: On receiving an aggregate signature for all message (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ) signed by n clients (C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n ) with the identity (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID n ). The verifier checks whether e(U , P) = e(PK + V , P pub ) holds. If this equation is valid, it accepts the message; otherwise, discards it.
B. ATTACK ON LIU et al. 's CL-AS SCHEME
As we know, (U i , V i ) as the signature on message m i with identity ID i should be unforgeable. In this subsection, we show a Type II adversary can successfully forge a valid aggregate signature.
The adversary A 2 is an honest but curious KGC, who knows the master key s. Suppose (U i , V i ) is the signature on the message m i signed by C i with the identity ID i . A 2 can forge a signature (U i * , V i * ) on the message M signed by C i with ID i .
Forgery Signature: The attack process can be described as follows:
. The verification will pass due to the fact that
According to the above analysis, (U i * , V i * ) is the legitimate signature on message M . In general, both partial private key and secret value are needed when signing a message. Our attack scheme does not require its secret value and does not conduct the Secret-Key-Queries [19] to get the secret value S i1 . In addition, the CLAS-Sign-Queries has never been queried with (ID i , M ). Hence, A 2 wins the game. Namely, A can forge n signatures for n clients.
Aggregation: Once these forged signatures are received, the aggregator aggregates these signatures into a single authentication signature (U i * , V i * ) as follows:
Aggregate Verification: (U * , V * ) is a valid aggregate signature on the message set {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n } if and only if e(U * , P) = e(PK + V * , P pub ) holds. The correctness proof is as follows:
In addition, any client has not submitted to the Secret-Key-Queries and CLAS-Sign-Queries with (ID i , M ). Therefore, Liu et al.'s CL-AS scheme is not existentially unforgeable against the Type II adversary.
C. ATTACK ON LIU ET AL.'S MHCS scheme
Unfortunately, we find the MHCS scheme [19] is insecure even an arbitrary user can forge the signature of any other user on a message. In this subsection, we will present a specific attack. A similar attack was also proposed in [41] .
Assume C i is a legal signer and it has the following parameters: PK i1 = S i1 P, PK i2 = H 1 (ID i , PK i1 ), S i2 = sPK i2 , index si = a i S i2 , index vi = a i PK i2 . Let C j be the target of signer C i . In order to forge a signature with the identity of ID j , C i sets the relevant parameters of C j as follows:
• Choose S j1 randomly as C i 's secret value, then compute PK j1 = S j1 P.
• Choose b j randomly, then compute index sj = b j index si and SN j = b j SN i .
Forgery Signature: C i can forge a signature as follows.
• Choose k j and compute V j = k i PK j1 , h j = H 2 (m j ||t j , V j ), where t j is the latest timestamp.
DC will verify its validity as follows:
The verification will pass due to the fact that e(U j , P) = e(index sj + k j h j S j1 P pub , P) = e(b j index si + k j h j S j1 P pub , P)
Therefore, C i can use C j 's identity information to forge the signature of any message.
V. IMPROVED DATA ANONYMOUS SIGNATURE SCHEME FOR MHCS
The major problem of Liu et al.'s CL-SA scheme [19] is that the client's secret value is not actually utilized, i.e. S i1 P pub in the scheme can be replaced by sPK i1 , so the signature can be forged. In addition, in their MHCS scheme [19] , the relationship between the public key S i2 PK i1 and the partial private key is not required for generating a valid signature in that index vi is not computed based on PK i1 in the verification [41] , which leads to any client can further blinding its partial secret key index si and public key index vi to forge a signature on any message. To address these issues, we present an improved anonymous scheme bases on CL-AS for MHCS.
Setup: KGC executes the algorithm as follows:
• Given a security parameter l, KGC defines two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with the same prime order q, where G 1 is an additive group and G 2 is a multiplicative group. P is a generator of G 1 . In addition, there exist a bilinear map e : G where s is a master key for partial key extraction and only known to the KGC.
• Publish these system parameters {l, q, e, G 1 , G 2 , P, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , P pub } and store the master key s secretly. It is worth noting that we suppose that DC has a long-term key pair < S DC , PK DC >, where PK DC = S DC P. UserRegistration: Client C i and KGC execute the following algorithm to generate the client's full private key and public key.
• C i with the identity ID i selects S i1 randomly and calculates PK i1 = S i1 P, where S i1 is the secret key. Then C i sends (ID i , PK i1 ) to KGC by secure channel.
• On receiving (ID i , PK i1 ), KGC computes PK i2 = H 1 (ID i , PK i1 ) and S i2 = sPK i2 .
• Then KGC stores the tuple (ID i , PK i1 , PK i2 , S i2 ) and sends (S i2 , PK i2 ) to C i in a secure manner.
• C i sets < S i1 , S i2 > as its private key. Signing: For a given health sensing data m i and private key < S i1 , S i2 >, C i performs the following steps to generate the corresponding signature.
• Select a random number k i and compute
Verification:
If t i is not valid, it rejects the message; otherwise accepts and processes it.
• Then DC decrypts SN i by its public key S DC , as D S DC (SN i ) = ID i ||W i . DC calculates PK i2 = H 1 (ID i , PK i1 ) and h i = H 2 (m i ||t i , V i ).
• Check whether e(U i , P) = e(V i + h i PK i2 , P pub )e(PK i1 , W i ) holds. If this equation is valid, it accepts the message; otherwise, it discards it. Aggregation: Each DC acts as an aggregator who can aggregate a number of messages from all clients.
t 2 } · · · {U n , V n , SN n , m n , t n } from n clients with identity {ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID n } and the corresponding public key {PK 11 , PK 21 , · · · , PK n1 }. DC computes:
• Then, DC treats (U , V , W , PK ) on all health sensing data (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , · · · , m n ) as the aggregate authentication message. VOLUME 7, 2019 Aggregate Verification: DC checks whether e(U , P) = e(V , P pub )e(PK , W ) holds or not. If so, it upload these health sensing data; otherwise, the data is discarded.
VI. DISCUSSION

A. CORRECTNESS PROOF
In this subsection, we show that the verification process in the proposed scheme is correct.
The correctness proof is as follows:
Hence, the single message verification equation of the proposed scheme is correct.
• Correctness of Aggregate Verification DC checks whether e(U , P) = e(V , P pub )e(PK , W ) holds or not. The correctness proof is as follows:
So, the proposed aggregate verification equation is correct.
B. SECURITY PROOF
Our proof method is similar as that of Liu et al. [19] . Its main idea is that if an polynomially bounded adversary (A 1 or A 2 ) who is able to forge a signature, then there exists a challenger (C 1 or C 2 ) who can solve the CDH problem. We will prove the security of the improved scheme under A 1 and A 2 's attacks respectively. Theorem 1: For the adversary A 1 , the proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the Random Oracle Model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G 1 is intractable. If a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A 1 has an advantage ε in forging a signature in an attack model after making at most q H i queries to random oracles H i for i = 1, 2, 3, at most q RPPK queries to the Reveal Partial Private Key Oracle, q RSK queries to the Reveal Secret Key Oracle, q CU queries to the Create User Oracle, q RK queries to the Replace Key and q S queries to the Sign oracle, then the CDH problem can be solved.
Proof: Let A 1 be a type I adversary. Assume that A 1 's target identity is ID * . We show how A 1 can be used by a PPT algorithm C 1 to solve the CDH problem in G 1 . Let (X = aP, Y = bP) be a random instance of the CDH problem in G 1 . A 1 interacts with C 1 as the security model is in Game I. Algorithm C 1 sets P pub = X and then starts performing oracle simulation. Without loss of generality, we assume that, for any key extraction query or signature query involving an identity, a H i (), i = 1, 2, 3, oracle query has previously been made on that identity. C 1 maintains a list L = (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) while A 1 is making queries throughout the game. C responds to A 1 's oracle queries as follows.
Initialization. C 1 sets P pub = X and executes Setup to generate other parameters. Challenger C 1 then gives system parameters to A 1 and keeps master key s secret.
Queries on Oracle H 1 ( ): C 1 maintains an initially-empty list L 1 that contains tuples of the form (ID i , PK i1 , c i , W i , PK i2 ). When an identity ID i is submitted to oracle H 1 , C 1 first flips a coin W i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability ξ and 1 with probability 1 − ξ . If W i = 0, then the hash value of H 1 (ID i , PK i1 ) is defined as PK i2 = c i P. If W i = 1, then C 1 returns PK i2 = c i bP = c i Y . Finally, C 1 returns PK i2 and adds PK i2 to the list L 1 .
Queries on Oracle H 2 ( ): Suppose (m i , V i ) is submitted to oracle H 2 . C 1 first scans L 2 = (m i , V i , h i ) to check whether H 2 has already been defined for that input. If so, the same answer is returned. Otherwise, C 1 picks h i ∈ Z * q at random and returns h i as a hash value of H 2 (m i , V i ) to A 1 and also stores the value in the list L 2 .
Queries on Oracle H 3 ( ): Suppose (m i , V i ) is submitted to oracle H 3 . C 1 first scans L 3 = (m i , V i , w i ) to check whether H 2 has already been defined for that input. If so, the same answer is returned. Otherwise, C 1 picks w i ∈ Z * q at random and returns w i as a hash value of H 3 (m i , V i ) to A 1 and also stores the value in the list L 3 .
Reveal Partial Private Key Queries: Suppose the request is on an identity ID i . C 1 first recovers the corresponding tuple (ID i , PK i1 , c i , W i , PK i2 ) from the list L 1 . If W i = 1, then C 1 returns failure and halts. Otherwise, C 1 checks whether L contains (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ).
If so, then C 1 checks whether S i2 = ⊥. If S i2 = ⊥, C 1 returns S i2 to A 1 . If S i2 = ⊥, C 1 recovers the (ID i , PK i1 , c i , W i , PK i2 ) from the list L 1 . Define S i2 = sPK i2 = sc i P = c i X as the partial key. Then C 1 returns S i2 to A 1 and writes S i2 in the list L.
Otherwise, C 1 recovers the corresponding (ID i , PK i1 , c i , W i , PK i2 ) from the list L 1 , and then sets S i2 = sPK i2 = sc i P = c i X . Finally, C 1 returns S i2 to A 1 and adds an element (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) to the list L.
Create User Queries: Suppose the request is on an identity ID i . On receiving a query, the current public key PK i1 from the list L 1 will be returned if the request previously was made. Otherwise, C 1 will pick a random v i and define PK i1 = v i P and S i1 = v i . C 1 returns PK i1 and adds (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) to L 1 .
Reveal Secret Key Queries: Suppose the request is on an identity ID i . On receiving a query on Reveal Secret key, if ID i = ID * , C 1 aborts; otherwise, if there is a tuple (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) on L, C 1 returns S i1 . Otherwise, C 1 makes a Create User query to generate PK i1 = v i P and S i1 = v i . Then C 1 saves these values in the list L and returns S i1 = v i to A 1 .
Replace Key Queries: Suppose A 1 makes the query with (ID i , PK * i1 ). If the list L contains an element (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ), C 1 sets PK i1 = PK * i1 and S i1 = ⊥. If the list L does not contain an item (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ), C 1 sets S i2 = ⊥, PK i1 = PK * i1 and S i1 = ⊥, and adds an element (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) to L.
Sign Queries: When A 1 makes a Sign-query on m i with ID i , C 1 first searches the corresponding (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) from the list L.
If the list L contains (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ), C 1 checks whether S i1 = ⊥. If S i1 = ⊥, C 1 makes the query to CreateUser Oracle to generate PK i1 = v i P and S i1 = v i .
Otherwise, if L does not contain an item (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ), C 1 makes queries to CreateUser Oracle on ID i , and then adds (ID i , S i1 , PK i1 , S i2 ) to the list L.
Then, C 1 randomly chooses k i , h i ∈ Z * q and computes V i = h i (r i P − PK i2 ). If the tuples containing h i already appear in list L 2 , then C 1 chooses other k i , h i ∈ Z * q and tries again. Then C 1 computes U i = h i r i P pub + v i W i and stores (m i ,
It is easy to verify (U i , V i ) via the above Eq.(9), so the simulation is perfect. If C 1 does not abort this game, none can distinguish the simulator from a legal signer.
Forgery: This step of the simulation is to apply the forking technique formalized in [22] . After replaying A 1 with the same random tape, C 1 obtains another signa-
Notice that the hash values h i * = h i * for the two choices of the hash function H 2 .
Then, C 1 recovers the corresponding tuple (ID * i , PK * i1 , c * i , W * i , PK * i2 ) from the list L 1 , if W * i = 0 then C 1 halts and fails. Otherwise, we have the following equalities:
According to the above Eq.(10) and Eq. (11), we obtain
Namely,
. Theorem 2: For the adversary A 2 , the proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the Random Oracle Model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G 1 is intractable. If a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A 2 has an advantage ε in forging a signature in an attack model after making at most q H i queries to random oracles H i for i = 1, 2, 3, q RSK queries to the Reveal Secret Key Oracle, q CU queries to the Create User Oracle and q S queries to the Sign oracle, then the CDH problem can be solved.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to Theorem 1. Thus, we omit the proof in detail.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
• Batch Verification: Through the proposed algorithm Aggregate Verification, the proposed scheme can provide batch verification. Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the batch verification requirement.
• Anonymity: Based on the description of the proposed scheme, the client's identity ID i is only included in SN i = E PK DC (ID i , W i ). Without knowing the secret key S DC of DC, it is infeasible for any adversary to extract the real identity of client according to the intercepted message. Thus, our provided scheme satisfies the privacy protection requirement.
• Mutual Authentication: In our scheme, each message generated by the client needs to be signed before being sent to DC, and DC can verify the message to ensure that the message has not been forged or modified by an adversary or illegal client. That means our scheme can achieve mutual authentication.
• Non-repudiation: The proposed scheme is based on certificateless cryptography, the public key of client is the necessary input to verify signature. Since no one can get client's private key, there is no information that can be forged. Thus, clients cannot deny their behavior at the end of the process. That means that our scheme supports non-repudiation.
• No Verifier Table: According to the description of the proposed scheme, DC and clients need to store their own private keys to communicate with each other, and they do not need to hold a verifier table during the interaction process. Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist the verifier table stolen attack.
• Attack Resistance: According to the proof of Theorem 1, no one can create a signature with a fake identity. Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist the impersonation attack and modification attack. Moreover, the timestamp is involved in the signature, so that DC can check the timestamp to determine if a message has been replayed. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against replay attack. In addition, the scheme can provide mutual authentication between client and DC, so the scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attack.
D. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
Computational overhead is an important factor in evaluating the performance of the scheme. In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of our improved CL-AS scheme by conducting comparisons with related schemes. Due to Setup and UserRegistration phases are executed by KGC or client, and both of them are one-time operation, we laid stress on the comparisons of the computation cost in Signing, Verification, Aggregation and AggregateVerification phases in the comparison. Here we only consider the costly operations and omit the computation efforts which can be completed in advance. We define P as a pairing operation, S as a scalar multiplication in G 1 and n as the number of single signature. Table 2 lists the comparison of the computation cost between our scheme and the previous classic CL-AS schemes [14] , [18] , [19] . In the proposed scheme, a client requires four scalar multiplication operations to produce a digital signature. In single signature verification, a verifier requires one scalar multiplication and three bilinear pairing operations. Thus, the cost of computation is 3P+S. To aggregate n messages in our proposed scheme, an aggregator requires n scalar multiplication operations. Finally, to verify n messages, a verifier requires three bilinear pairing operations, which is independent from the number of messages.
According to Table 2 , it is easy to see that our proposed scheme has better performance in terms of computation cost and security comparing with existing schemes. Although the total computation cost in [19] is less than our proposed scheme, we have found that the scheme is insecure. On the one hand, the security problem is the most important factor in MHCS, it is worthwhile to sacrifice a little computation cost for security within the acceptable range. On the other hand, the computation cost will be lower and lower with the performance improvement of smart mobile sensing devices. Therefore, the above analysis of security requirements and efficiency shows that our scheme is secure and efficient, and it is suitable for MHCS environment.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we give cryptanalysis of the batch verification scheme for MHCS proposed by Liu et al. [19] . We point out the insecurity of the scheme by giving two concrete attacks. Subsequently, we put forward a new scheme with really secure against forgery attack, identity tracing and other security attacks in Random Oracle Model. The security of our scheme can be converted to the CDH difficult problem assumption. Performance analysis shows that our scheme can satisfy the security requirements without increasing the computational load, and it is more useful for protecting the integrity and privacy of user healthcare information.
However, security proof of our proposed scheme is based on Random Oracle Model, Standard Model and more formal verification solutions will be adopted for MHCS environment in the future work.
